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Abstract
This paper introduces a new object-oriented speciﬁcation and modeling language called DeSpec. The
language targets primarily model checking in the Windows NT kernel driver environment. It integrates the
majority of Zing modeling language features and adds means for deﬁning parameterized abstractions of the
environment at varying levels of detail. The DeSpec language also enables capturing constrains imposed on
drivers by the Windows kernel in a form of quantiﬁed temporal logic patterns – easy-to-read templates of
LTL formulae introduced by the Bandera toolset.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, eﬀorts to verify correctness of Windows kernel drivers [22] have
emerged as it is crucial for stability of the whole operating system. Microsoft itself
has developed several tools for driver veriﬁcation including the latest Static Driver
Veriﬁer model checker. The key to successful application of the model checking
approach in this area is a reasonable choice of the environment model. However, the
environment models used in current tools are too (1) non-deterministic, degrading
preciseness of the model checker reports, and (2) oversimpliﬁed, loosing the ability
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to check more speciﬁc kinds of properties of drivers. On the other hand, neither a
formal or readable speciﬁcation usable for documentation purposes is provided by
these models. This paper targets these issues by introducing a new language for
formal speciﬁcation and modeling of kernel drivers and their environment.
Please note that due to space limitations the paper presents only a small excerpt
of the language features. The full language speciﬁcation, detailed elaboration of its
features and also a large sample speciﬁcation of the Windows environment can be
found in [15].
1.1 Model Checking
Model checking technique is a formal veriﬁcation method based on thorough ex-
amination of a program model state space. The model reﬂects behavior of the
program related to the property being veriﬁed. It should ideally retain any part of
the software that might inﬂuence the property so that the veriﬁcation is sound and
complete. On the other hand, the model should be as simple as possible since the
model checker has to explore all its possible states. The time and space require-
ments for the veriﬁcation are growing exponentially with respect to the number of
operations, threads and variables used in the model (the state explosion problem
[17]).
Usually, the goal is not to model check the system as a whole. Instead, the
system is split into two pieces – a particular component of interest (a module,
also an open system [32]) and the rest of the system (the module’s environment).
The environment is considered correct and its provided and required interfaces are
deﬁned by a speciﬁcation. The veriﬁcation tool is expected to extract a partial
model from the module’s source code and complete it by including the environment’s
behavior model according to the speciﬁcation. The resulting model passed to the
model checker, captures the module’s interaction with the environment relevant to
a set of properties being veriﬁed.
The process of model extraction from the program’s source code is a diﬃcult
task as the source code language itself can induce major problems. A C language
extractor needs to understand constructs like pointers, arrays, unions, reinterpreting
type casts, etc. Fortunately, even though some of these constructs in general allow
the extractor to build neither sound nor complete model of the program, results of
the software veriﬁcation are still valuable. All the issues of the model extraction
from the C source code have already been presented in a diﬀerent paper [16].
This paper focuses on a formal description of the environment that combines
the requirements on the module and modeling of the functionality provided by the
environment. Temporal logics (e. g. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [14]) are often
used for the former. They deﬁne how properties of the system should change in time
using predicates quantiﬁed over time variable. However, specifying properties of a
real application by means of plain temporal logic comes with a signiﬁcant drawback.
The speciﬁcation is not easy to comprehend for the most of driver programmers and
if a formula gets more complex neither for temporal logic experts.
Plain logic unreadability drives eﬀorts to develop a higher-level language like
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Bandera Temporal Logic Patterns [9]. Properties expressed in this language are
translated into the temporal logic formulae consumed by many existing veriﬁcation
tools. The patterns allow writing frequently used temporal logic formulae in very
simple plain English sentences, e. g. “P is absent between Q and R” is representing
the ((Q ∧ ¬R ∧ R)⇒ [P U R]) formula. Though incomplete the patterns are
suﬃcient to specify widely used properties. Moreover, additional patterns can be
added to the repertoire if needed.
In our work, we use Zing modeling language [1,24] as a basis for speciﬁcation of
the environment behavior and also as the output language of the model extractor.
Zing language and Zing model checker have been developed by Microsoft Research
group. The choice was made due to Zing’s rich modeling functionality and the state
of its current development (the preview implementation is available and works quite
well). However, most ideas behind this work are not dependent on the target mod-
eling language and can be applied to any other modeling language that provides at
least classes, methods, exceptions, non-deterministic choices, and threads. Another
modeling language meeting these criteria should be the new version of Bandera In-
termediate Representation (BIR) – a modeling language of Bogor model checking
framework [28].
1.2 Checking Windows Drivers
Windows kernel drivers are relatively small libraries usually written in the C lan-
guage. They run in a privileged mode that enables them to work directly with
hardware. This introduces a high risk of damaging other parts of the kernel if a
driver contains an error. Hence the correctness of drivers is crucial for security
and stability of an operating system and drivers are common subject of software
veriﬁcation.
A driver can be seen as a component put into the environment comprising of the
kernel and other drivers. Since drivers usually communicate with each other only
via kernel function calls the inclusion of the other drivers into the environment is
an acceptable simpliﬁcation. The veriﬁer deals with the open system veriﬁcation as
the source code of the Windows kernel is usually not available. And even if it was,
it would be virtually impossible to extract and verify the kernel model due to its
inherent complexity. Besides, drivers shouldn’t depend on the exact behavior of the
private parts of the kernel as they can change version to version. Only the public
documented functionality should be relied on.
So the model extractor should only work with the kernel speciﬁcation. However,
such speciﬁcation is not currently available in a form that would be feasible to
drive the model extractor – the only source of oﬃcial documentation is the Driver
Development Kit (DDK) [21] provided by Microsoft, where the rules the drivers
should comply with are described in plain English and some important details are
stated vaguely or even missing entirely. It is a goal of our work to provide a language
for writing the speciﬁcation and to apply it on signiﬁcant parts of the kernel API.
Several tools that verify driver correctness have already been developed by Mi-
crosoft itself. These include the Driver Veriﬁer [18] tool for run-time driver veriﬁca-
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tion, the PREfast [19] static analysis tool based on local analysis of driver functions
and ﬁnally the Static Driver Veriﬁer (SDV) [20] (still in development) based on
techniques of static analysis of the whole driver and model checking.
The Static Driver Veriﬁer (SDV) models the kernel environment in C language
enriched with special functions and macros that handle non-determinism necessary
for emulating various execution paths. The rules the drivers can be veriﬁed against
are written in Speciﬁcation Language for Interface Checking (SLIC) [2]. Express-
ing a rule in the SLIC language inheres in writing pieces of C pseudo-code and
deﬁning how the environment model should be instrumented by them. The re-
sulting instrumented code is converted to an abstract Boolean program which is
passed to the model checker. The very ﬁrst Boolean program extracted from the
instrumented code abstracts from all local variables and replaces all conditions by
non-deterministic choices. Error traces are then discovered by the model checker
and confronted with the original program via symbolic execution. If an error trace
describes the execution that is actually infeasible, the Boolean program is reﬁned
to be more speciﬁc with respect to the variables inﬂuencing the trace. The reﬁned
program is passed back to the model checker. This process of error search and model
specialization repeats until there are no infeasible error traces found or a timeout
elapses.
The environment model and the SLIC language allows safety properties to be
checked with respect to operations performed sequentially on a single device object
(an object representing a device in the driver). SLIC rules are limited to safety
properties so it is not possible to encode all the rules deﬁned in the DDK. The
rules are speciﬁed separately from kernel environment which makes them less main-
tainable. Inability to model multi-threaded environment and simultaneous work on
more device objects also prevents from veriﬁcation of some race conditions com-
monly contained in faulty Windows drivers. In this work we introduce a solution
that does not have these shortcomings.
1.3 Paper Contribution
The aim of this work is to make it possible to specify and model the kernel environ-
ment in a formal yet comprehensible form, which could be used not only for precise
documentation of the kernel API but above all as an input for a model extractor
that produces veriﬁable concurrent models of the Windows drivers. For this pur-
pose, the paper introduces a new speciﬁcation and modeling language called Driver
Environment Speciﬁcation Language (abbreviated as DeSpec). As shown in [15],
the language is able to capture a signiﬁcant subset of the rules imposed on drivers
by the DDK including those that are diﬃcult or impossible to express in the SLIC
language and hence currently not veriﬁable by the SDV.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the Win-
dows kernel environment from a point of view of the driver veriﬁcation. Section 3
introduces the DeSpec language, explains its part on an example and describes
how a model extractor should work with DeSpec speciﬁcations. Section 4 discusses
related work and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Windows Kernel Environment
The Windows kernel executive comprises of several components that manage various
system resources – the managers [31]. The managers provide services for the other
parts of the executive and for drivers. The I/O Manager, the Plug & Play Manager,
and the Power Manager are the ones that are most interesting for driver veriﬁcation
as they do the majority of communication with drivers. Note, this work is limited
only to drivers following the Windows Driver Model (WDM) [26]. Such drivers have
to implement Plug & Play and power management features.
The I/O Manager loads and unloads drivers and issues I/O requests on them.
The drivers are directly controlled by the I/O Manager, which issues I/O requests
in form of I/O Request Packets (IRPs). If a driver can complete the request it ﬁlls
in a place in the packet reserved for output parameters and passes the packet back
to the manager. If it doesn’t implement the required functionality it can pass the
request to an optional lower level driver – a hierarchy is being formed by such inter-
driver relationships. The other managers issue their requests and notiﬁcations to
the drivers through the I/O Manager. For example, the Plug & Play Manager keeps
track of the device state transitions (device removal, stopping, starting, etc.) and
the Power Manager monitors the power state of the machine (whether it is going
to sleep, awaking, etc.). Both managers notify the driver appropriately by sending
it the respective IRPs.
Each driver has to respond correctly to an arbitrary request and content of the
packet. It can return a result indicating an error, but it must never crash or damage
other parts of the kernel. The driver cannot make any assumptions about drivers
above or below it in the hierarchy. This requirement allows the veriﬁcation tool to
isolate the driver and test it on arbitrary inputs and outputs from the I/O Manager
and higher/lower level drivers.
3 Driver Environment Speciﬁcation Language
3.1 Overview
The Driver Environment Speciﬁcation Language (DeSpec) is an object-oriented
speciﬁcation and modeling language incorporating the majority of features of the
Zing modeling language [1] combined with design-by-contract elements inspired by
Spec# language [3], and Bandera Temporal Logic Patterns [9]. It is designed to
guide extraction of Zing models from source code of Windows kernel drivers.
DeSpec language allows modeling of I/O Manager’s behavior to drivers, mod-
eling of kernel functions behavior and specifying constrains and rules that drivers
should obey when calling these functions. Models and abstractions can be deﬁned
in various levels of detail, which, as one of the solutions ﬁghting against the state
space explosion problem, enables the model extractor to infer the smallest available
model suﬃcient for the veriﬁcation of a particular rule.
DeSpec language provides means for capturing basic elements of the interaction
between driver and its environment (i. e. global variables, functions and data struc-
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tures). It is designed as a bridge between constructs of the C language and their
models in the Zing language. In particular the models of pointers, function pointers,
unions and other constructs that are not directly expressible in the Zing language
are hidden behind the syntax of DeSpec language. This allows to adjust models for
these features without a need to rewrite the speciﬁcations.
Apparently, some constructs exploiting memory layout, such as reinterpreting
casts or unions, cannot be modeled in a feasible way. Therefore they are not directly
expressible in the DeSpec language. Fortunately, the driver as well as environment
interface should be as platform independent as possible and thus these constructs
should be used rarely.
3.2 Structure of Speciﬁcations
The DeSpec language is similar to the C# language in its syntactical structure.
Each source ﬁle contains a list of declarations grouped to namespaces. Declarations
include classes, integer enumerations, integer ranges, method delegates and method
groups. A class declaration comprises of its members. Apart from ﬁelds and meth-
ods, which are common for standard object-oriented languages, DeSpec classes can
also contain rules. A rule speciﬁes constrains on ﬁelds and methods by means of
temporal logic patterns. This section brieﬂy describes DeSpec namespaces, classes
and rules.
3.2.1 Namespaces
A namespace deﬁnes a scope for abstractions of kernel functions and structures.
When the model extractor searches for an abstraction of a kernel function or a struc-
ture used in the driver’s source code it looks up a single namespace only. The choice
of the namespace depends on the constrains to be veriﬁed. The default (global)
namespace describes a minimal model for kernel functions and structures. Other
namespaces usually reﬁne the default model – making it more complex to enable
veriﬁcation of a constraint not expressible by means of default model. Constraints
are embedded into the speciﬁcation as method preconditions, postconditions, type
constrains, rules, etc. By choosing the constraint to verify, the containing names-
pace is designated for being searched by the extractor. The ability to diﬀerentiate
speciﬁcations by level of details is important for reducing the size of the resulting
model.
3.2.2 Classes
Although Windows kernel is written in the C programming language its design is
object oriented. Usually, a structure representing an object within the kernel (e. g.
a semaphore, mutex or device) is provided along with functions working with it.
These functions behave like methods of the structure (object) as they all take a
pointer to the structure as one of their parameters (the “this” reference). A notion
of inheritance is also present on several places. Inheritance is used for sharing data
among structures representing diﬀerent yet related objects. The sharing technically
inheres in declaring common initial ﬁelds in the related structures.
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These observations justify introduction of classes as main elements of the spec-
iﬁcations – the kernel structures provided to drivers are modeled in DeSpec as
classes. The functions bound to these structures are declared as class instance
methods. Functions not bound to any instance are mapped to static methods. The
formal parameter referring to the instance the method is working on is speciﬁed
by the instance keyword. The method (whether static or instance) abstracting a
kernel function has to have the same name as the kernel function and no other
method in the same namespace can have the same name (even though declared in
another class). This rule allows the model extractor to ﬁnd a speciﬁcation of a
function whose call has been observed in the source code. An example of a class
speciﬁcation follows:
Example 1.
class DEVICE_OBJECT {
NTSTATUS IoAttachDevice(instance,_,out DEVICE_OBJECT attachedTo)
requires !Driver.IsLowest;
{
NTSTATUS status = choose
{
NTSTATUS.STATUS_SUCCESS,
NTSTATUS.STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER,
NTSTATUS.STATUS_OBJECT_TYPE_MISMATCH,
NTSTATUS.STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID,
NTSTATUS.STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES
};
attachedTo = IsSuccessful(status) ? Driver.LowerDevice : null;
return status;
}
DEVICE_OBJECT IoAttachDeviceToDeviceStack(instance,_)
requires !Driver.IsLowest;
{
return (choose(bool)) ? Driver.LowerDevice : null;
}
void IoDetachDevice(instance);
/* more members follow */
}
In Example 1, the DEVICE OBJECT class abstracts the structure of the same
name. Instances of the structure represent devices that drivers are working with.
Both IoAttachDevice and IoAttachDeviceToDeviceStack kernel functions attach the
device object to the top of the device objects chain. The immediate lower device
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object, where the instance is attached to, is returned in the attachedTo output
argument and in the return value, respectively. The IoDetachDevice simply detaches
the immediate higher level device from this device object instance 4 .
The signature of a method abstracting a kernel function deﬁnes how parameters
of the function are treated within the speciﬁcation. The placeholder token (a single
underscore) is used for arguments that are not important for the speciﬁcation. The
models of IoAttach- functions do not care about the second parameter. When a
speciﬁcation refers to the IoAttachDevice method, only one argument is stated in
the list of actual arguments. The instance argument is picked from the argument
list out before the method to denote the target instance using the dot notation.
Arguments on the positions of placeholders are also omitted in the actual argument
list. Methods declared in Example 1 are referred to as follows:
device.IoAttachDevice(out lower_device)
device.IoAttachDeviceToDeviceStack()
lower_device.IoDetachDevice()
The out keyword speciﬁes that the argument is an output argument and has to
be assigned within the method’s body. The output argument is mapped to the C
language by an additional level of indirection. The C type of the argument is thus
DEVICE OBJECT**. The ref keyword is also supported for marking arguments passed
in and out by reference.
A possibly empty list of preconditions and postconditions follows the signature.
The syntax is similar to the one used in the Spec# language – the conditions
are introduced by requires and ensures keywords, respectively. The condition is a
Boolean expression with some limitations on the terms. The conditions stated in
Example 1 require the lowest level driver not to call the IoAttach- functions. Pre-
and postconditions are translated to assertions when the Zing model of the method
is generated.
The body deﬁnes a model of the method’s behavior using Zing syntax enriched
with additional constructs that are translated to the Zing when the resulting model
is generated. In Example 1, extended forms of the Zing’s choose operator are used.
Type NTSTATUS is an integer enumeration abstracting the kernel type of the same
name. The operator IsSuccessful determines whether a value is a successful value
of its type as recognized by the kernel.
The body can also be omitted at all if the modeled function does nothing that
inﬂuences the driver at the current level of abstraction and only its calls are signif-
icant. If a kernel function returns some value to the caller (via a return value or
output parameters), throws an exception or has some side-eﬀect the speciﬁcation
method should have a body that models these operations.
Since a DeSpec class is usually an abstraction of a public kernel structure, it
may contain ﬁelds corresponding to the ﬁelds of the structure. Additional ﬁelds
that do not correspond to real ﬁelds might be necessary for storing auxiliary data
4 Note the reverse roles of the device objects – the higher level device object is attaching but the lower
level device object is detaching.
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used only for the sole purpose of modeling. Such ﬁelds are marked by the synthetic
keyword. Similarly, synthetic methods and also synthetic classes can be deﬁned
in the speciﬁcation. In general, DeSpec distinguishes synthetic language elements
from non-synthetic ones. Note that all elements used in the ﬁrst example are non-
synthetic. Synthetic classes contain no abstractions, particularly no kernel function
is mapped to a method of a synthetic class. Example of a class containing synthetic
attributes follows:
Example 2.
static class Driver {
synthetic DEVICE_OBJECT LowerDevice = new DEVICE_OBJECT;
[ModelParam]
synthetic const bool IsLowest = false;
/* more members follow */
}
In Example 2, two synthetic ﬁelds are deﬁned in the static class. The ﬁrst
one, LowerDevice, is used as a dummy device object that all devices of the current
driver are attached to. The model can abstract from the precise device objects chain
because the drivers shouldn’t care about what drivers are layered beneath them in
the chain. Similar simpliﬁcations are necessary to reduce the size of the generated
model.
The second ﬁeld named IsLowest is a literal constant ﬁeld deﬁning whether or
not the driver is the lowest level driver in the driver chain. The ﬁeld is annotated
by the ModelParam attribute, which means that its initial value should be set by
the user prior to the model extraction. Model parameterization is utilized when
the model depends on a property that is diﬃcult to deduce automatically from the
driver’s source code. It can be also used for model size tuning.
3.2.3 Rules
Another member that can be present in the class is a rule. The rule is a list of
quantiﬁed temporal logic patterns [9] with pattern parameters ﬁlled with Boolean
expressions.
Example 3.
class DEVICE_OBJECT {
/* method declarations from Example 1 omitted */
static rule
forall(DEVICE_OBJECT device)
{
_.IoAttachDevice(out device)::succeeded ||
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(device === _.IoAttachDeviceToDeviceStack()) && device!=null
}
corresponds to
{
device.IoDetachDevice()
}
globally;
}
The rule in Example 3 is a single pattern, however, in general, a rule is a list
of quantiﬁed temporal logic patterns separated by commas and ending by a semi-
colon. The rule presented has the following meaning: “Each successfully attached
device is eventually detached and each device that is detached has previously been
successfully attached.” Rest of the section explains the patterns in more detail.
Each temporal logic pattern is formed by pattern keywords and pattern expres-
sions. The pattern used in Example 3 can be generalized to {P} corresponds to {Q}
globally, where P and Q are Boolean expressions. Each pattern can be split into two
parts: the property and the scope. In this case, the property is {P} corresponds to
{Q} and the scope is globally. A list of available pattern properties follows:
(i) {Q} is universal
(ii) {Q} is absent
(iii) {Q} exists
(iv) {Q} precedes {R}
(v) {Q} leads to {R}
(vi) {R} responds to {Q}
(vii) {Q} corresponds to {R}
Properties (i) to (vi) are deﬁned in [9]. Properties (v) and (vi) are equivalent and
it depends on the situation which one is more appropriate to use. The property (vii)
is equivalent to a conjunction of properties (v) and (iv), i. e. to {Q} leads to {R}
∧ {Q} precedes {R}. It has been introduced to the language since the combination
is frequently used in the kernel environment and it would be inconvenient to write
the two patterns separately. The available scopes are:
(i) globally
(ii) before {S}
(iii) after {P}
(iv) after {P} until {S}
(v) between {P} and {S}
The meaning of each property and scope is obvious. Detailed deﬁnitions can
be found in [9] along with the equivalent LTL formulae. The LTL formulae for
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Method event opera-
tor
Eﬀect
M(args)::entered Returns true after M is entered with speciﬁed arguments
until M returns. Return value is ignored.
M(args)
M(args)::returned
Returns true after M is called with speciﬁed arguments
and with any return value until M is entered again with
the same arguments.
M(args)::succeeded Returns true after M is called with speciﬁed arguments
and with a successful return value untilM is entered again
with the same arguments.
M(args)::failed Returns true after M is called with speciﬁed arguments
and with an unsuccessful return value until M is entered
again with the same arguments.
expr === M(args)
expr !== M(args)
Returns true after M is called with speciﬁed arguments
and with a return value (un)equal to the value of the expr
until M is entered again with the same arguments.
Table 1
Source code event operators for methods. M stands for non-synthetic methods, args stands for a list of
arguments (possibly empty), and expr denotes an expression.
Q-corresponds-to-R pattern with the global scope is
(Q ⇒ R) ∧ [R W Q] 5 .
Temporal patterns can be quantiﬁed over value types or reference types. Pat-
terns of instance rules are implicitly quantiﬁed by a variable of the declaring type.
Instance rules can refer to that variable by using this keyword. This keyword can
be omitted when referring to the instance members of the type. Unlike Bandera
[8], DeSpec allows to quantify over value types (i. e. integers, Boolean, enumera-
tions). Zing symbolic value types can be used for the implementation. The reference
type quantiﬁcation may be implemented in the same way as in the Bandera, how-
ever more scalable implementation would be possible using Zing symbolic reference
types, which should be available in the next version of the Zing.
Boolean expressions comprising pattern parameters should refer to so called
source code events via source code event operators. A source code event refers
to an execution of a particular piece of code. DeSpec allows to specify events
corresponding to function calls and operations on ﬁelds (read and write) within the
5
 is the universal time quantiﬁer (always in the future),  is the existential time quantiﬁer (sometime
in the future), [ϕ W ψ] is the weak until operator (either ψ never holds and ϕ holds always, or ψ holds
sometime in the future and ϕ holds until that moment).
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Field event operator Eﬀect
F::read Returns true after F is read from.
F::written Returns true after F is written to.
expr === F::get
expr !== F::get
Returns true after F is read from and the value read is
(not) equal to the value of the expr.
expr === F::set
expr !== F::set
Returns true after F is written to and the value written
is (not) equal to the value of the expr.
Table 2
Source code event operators for ﬁelds. F stands for a non-synthetic ﬁeld and expr denotes an expression.
driver’s source code. Hence, source code event operators are applicable on non-
synthetic methods and ﬁelds only. Available source code event operators are listed
in Table 1 and Table 2.
In Example 3, the source code event deﬁned by the method(args)::succeeded op-
erator establishes a watchdog for successful returns from the kernel function IoAt-
tachDevice. It is triggered by only such function return that the third argument
can be uniﬁed with the device quantiﬁcation variable and the function return value
means a successful call. The ﬁrst two arguments could have been arbitrary when
the function was called.
Each source code event operator is replaced by the corresponding predicate for
the purpose of rule veriﬁcation. The use of the source code event operator inside a
pattern expression implies adding a global state variable to the resulting Zing model
and instrumentation of the model with pieces of Zing code that make transitions
of the state. The value of the operator state variable determines the value of the
LTL formula predicate. Although Zing doesn’t support LTL veriﬁcation directly, it
is possible to use run-time veriﬁcation algorithm proposed by [11].
3.3 DeSpec Driven Model Extraction
Inputs to the model extraction process are the source code of the driver being
veriﬁed, kernel header ﬁles, and the speciﬁcations of kernel functions and data
structures written in DeSpec. At the beginning, the user should select a set of
constrains that he or she wants to verify.
The user also chooses the top-level model to be used for the veriﬁcation. This
model is also written in DeSpec as a class implementing the predeﬁned methods.
Its task is to emulate the kernel’s behavior to the driver including driver loading
and initialization and issuing I/O requests (IRPs). Default top-level model is the
most complex one. It emulates multiprocessor environment, multiple device objects,
and concurrent IRPs. However, for a veriﬁcation of some rules a simpler model
may be suﬃcient. DeSpec allows to write and use such model. The choice of the
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simpler model may radically reduce the size of state space and make the veriﬁcation
faster and sometimes even allow the veriﬁcation to be completed in realistic time.
However, some errors may remain undiscovered.
Once the top-level model is chosen, the model extractor generates Zing model
of the driver (using its C source code and kernel headers) and combines it with the
environment model. Since the resulting model is too large to be veriﬁed, the slicing
[13,10] should take place retaining only those parts transitively referred to by the
top-level model and the constrains being veriﬁed. As a ﬁnal result, a Zing model of
the driver and the related kernel functions and structures are output.
4 Related Work
This work incorporates or relies on ideas and approaches of model checking [6,17],
model extraction [7,30], temporal logics [27,14,5], source code static analysis and
slicing [13,10], and Windows kernel driver environment [31,26].
In particular, the Zing model checker [1], Bandera toolset (especially the Bogor
model checking framework [28,29]), Java Path Finder [25], and SPIN model checker
[12,4] are related tools devoted to the model checking.
The SLAM project [23] is addressing the static analysis and veriﬁcation of the
C programs, especially the Windows kernel drivers. The beta version of Microsoft
Static Driver Veriﬁer (SDV) tool [20] has been recently released as a result of eﬀorts
in this area. Since this paper targets on Windows kernel drivers veriﬁcation, the
SDV is the closest related work. The way how rules are speciﬁed in this tool limits
its veriﬁcation power to safety properties. The environment model used by SDV
is single-threaded, preventing veriﬁcation of some race conditions, and quite non-
deterministic, introducing additional false reports. It neither provides a speciﬁcation
of the kernel functions that might be used as a documentation. On the other hand,
SDV is a functional tool whose application in practice already led to discovering
several errors in Microsoft’s own drivers.
Finding errors in drivers is not limited to the model checking technique.
Microsoft PREfast tool for drivers [19] performs static analysis of the source code
and searches for common error patterns. It can, for example, ﬁnd memory leaks
incurred by missing function calls, dereferences of null pointers, buﬀer overruns,
kernel functions called on incorrect IRQL level, and so on. The analysis is function
scoped and hence it introduces false negatives and also restricts a set of errors it is
able to detect.
The Windows operating system also enables to check how drivers work in stress
conditions such as lack of memory, missing resources, lost packets, etc. In cooper-
ation with the kernel, Driver Veriﬁer tool [18] emulates such conditions and runs
tests on the speciﬁed driver. The tool is able to detect many errors but it doesn’t
do any static veriﬁcation so many execution paths remain unchecked.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper introduces the DeSpec language – a new speciﬁcation and modeling
language designed to enable writing modular, readable, and well arranged speci-
ﬁcations of the Windows kernel driver environment as well as formally, yet still
comprehensibly, capture rules imposed on drivers by the kernel and documented in
plain English in DDK.
Expressiveness and suitability of the language are demonstrated on a part of the
kernel functionality in [15]. This work also shows that the available documentation
of the kernel environment [21] is not suﬃcient for its formal speciﬁcation without a
deeper understanding of the Windows kernel.
As the DeSpec language is intended to be utilized by model checking tools, it
addresses the main issue of this veriﬁcation method – the state explosion problem.
The abstractions may vary in the level of detail chosen according to the properties
being veriﬁed. Complexity of the model can be further tuned by the user speciﬁed
model parameters. By setting these parameters, the user can inﬂuence how complex
the extracted model will be and what may it neglect. The user may also select a
subset of tested driver functionality by choosing an appropriate top-level model.
The possibility of verifying LTL formulae with ﬁnite trace semantics using as-
sertions only (see [11]) arises a question whether the use of temporal rules brings
something new beyond the use of explicit assertions. Although many rules may be
equivalently veriﬁed manually, i. e. by adding assertions (or method contracts) on
the right places in the functions’ model code, the use of rules has some advantages.
Several advantages are implied by the locality. If entire “business logic” of the rule
is written on a single place it is easier maintainable, more readable, and the veriﬁ-
cation of the rule can be easier (un)selected for veriﬁcation. Besides, when the rule
is more complex it wouldn’t be easy to manually keep track of all operations in the
code that inﬂuences the veriﬁed property. On the other hand, some rules are too
complicated to write or comprehend that it is better to implement them manually
by explicit assertions.
The ideas proposed by this paper are currently being implemented. The im-
plementation comprises of the DeSpec language analyzer and a model extractor
consuming C source code and producing a Zing model driven by DeSpec speciﬁca-
tions.
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